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1. Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general and highly successful framework for artificial
intelligence (Hutter, 2005; Sutton and Barto, 2018). In essence, it involves an agent
interacting with an environment by taking actions and receiving observations and re-
wards. The goal of the agent is to maximize the rewards it accumulates over its lifetime
or episode.
From an AI safety perspective (Everitt, Lea, et al., 2018), we must bear in mind that
in any practically implemented system, agent reward may not coincide with user utility.1
In other words, the agent may have found a way to obtain reward without doing the
task. This is sometimes called reward hacking or reward corruption (Amodei, Olah, et
al., 2016; Everitt, Krakovna, et al., 2017). We distinguish between a few different types
of reward hacking. First, did the agent exploit a misspecification in the process that
computes the rewards, or did it modify the process? In line with previous literature,
we call the first type reward gaming and the second reward tampering (Leike, Krueger,
et al., 2018; Leike, Martic, et al., 2017).
Reward tampering, which will be the focus of this paper, can be further separated into
three subtypes, depending on whether the agent has tampered with the reward function,
the feedback that trains the reward function, or the input to the reward function. Let
us briefly outline these problems now. First, regardless of whether the reward is chosen
by a computer program, a human, or both, a sufficiently capable, real-world agent may
find a way to tamper with the decision. The agent may for example hack the computer
program that determines the reward. Such a strategy may bring high agent reward and
low user utility. This reward function tampering problem will be explored in Section 3.
Fortunately, there are modifications of the RL objective that remove the agent’s incentive
to tamper with the reward function.
The related problem of reward gaming can occur even if the agent never tampers
with the reward function. A promising way to mitigate the reward gaming problem is
to let the user continuously give feedback to update the reward function, using online
reward-modeling (Christiano, Leike, et al., 2017; Leike, Krueger, et al., 2018). Whenever
the agent finds a strategy with high agent reward but low user utility, the user can give
feedback that dissuades the agent from continuing the behavior. However, a worry with
online reward modeling is that the agent may influence the feedback. For example, the
agent may prevent the user from giving feedback while continuing to exploit a misspec-
ified reward function, or manipulate the user to give feedback that boosts agent reward
but not user utility. This feedback tampering problem and its solutions will be the focus
of Section 4.
Finally, the agent may tamper with the input to the reward function, so-called RF-
input tampering, for example by gluing a picture in front of its camera to fool the reward
function that the task has been completed. This problem and its potential solution
will be the focus of Section 5. Between the three of them, reward function tampering,
1Leike, Martic, et al. (2017) made the same distinction, instead using the terms (visible) reward and
performance.
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Figure 1: Types of reward tampering problems. Feedback tampering means tampering
with the user’s preferences or the user’s updating of the agent’s reward function
(Section 4). RF-input tampering means tampering with the information that
the reward function has about the environment state (Section 5). Reward
function tampering means tampering with the implemented reward function
itself or the number it outputs (Section 3).
feedback tampering, and observation tampering cover the main avenues for agents to
obtain more reward by tampering with the reward process, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Key contribution. The key contribution of this paper is to describe the above-mentioned
reward tampering problems as well as many of their proposed solutions in terms of causal
influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 1984), an extension of causal graphs (Pearl,
2009) with special decision and utility nodes. We show that:
1. many reward tampering problems correspond to an ‘undesired’ causal path in a
suitable causal influence diagram, and
2. many reward tampering solutions correspond to a modification of the diagram that
removes the undesired path.
In this way, the diagrams bring great clarity both to the reward tampering problems and
to the central elements of proposed solutions. The unified treatment also allows us to
compare corrigibility and self-preservation properties, illuminate some crucial assump-
tions, and see how the various proposed solutions can fit together. The analysis builds
on previous work on causal influence diagrams (Everitt, Kumar, et al., 2019; Everitt,
Ortega, et al., 2019) and on categorizing reward tampering problems (Everitt, 2018;
Everitt and Hutter, 2018; Majha et al., 2019). The basics of these methods will be
reviewed in Section 2.
The paper concludes with discussion and final remarks in Sections 6 and 7. Appendices
provide a list of notation, more involved influence diagrams with explicit equations, as
well as a simple but complete numerical example.
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Figure 2: Rocks and diamonds
2. Background
2.1. Reinforcement learning
RL is a machine learning method for training agents to solve sequential decision problems
(Sutton and Barto, 2018). In the simplest formulation, an agent transitions between
states by taking actions, while receiving a real-valued reward signal in each state. The
goal of the agent is to maximize the cumulative reward over an episode or lifetime, which
usually comprises a significant number of time steps. The designer decides the rewards
associated with each state, and the agent searches for a way to reach states that carry
high reward while avoiding states with low or negative reward. Powerful RL agents can
often find strategies which no human was able to conceive of. Recently this has happened
in Atari (Hessel et al., 2017; Mnih, Kavukcuoglu, et al., 2015), Go (Silver, Huang, et al.,
2016), Chess (Silver, Hubert, et al., 2017), and Starcraft (Vinyals et al., 2019).
Mathematically, an RL environment can be described with a Markov decision process
(MDP). It consists of a set of states, a set of rewards, and a set of actions. Usually,
the sets are required to be finite. A state-transition function T (s′ | s, a) describes the
probability of transitioning from state s to s′ when taking action a, and a reward function
R(s) describes2 the reward assigned to state s. The goal is to find a policy π(a | s) for
selecting the actions that maximizes expected cumulative reward over an episode.
Example 1 (Rocks and diamonds running example). As a running example throughout
the paper, we will consider a toy-environment where the agent can move rocks and
diamonds in a Sokoban-style gridworld. The agent is rewarded for bringing diamonds
but not rocks to a goal area: at time t, the reward is
Rt = #diamonds in goal area−#rocks in goal area. ♦
More general formalizations of RL allow partial observability (Kaelbling et al., 1998)
and an infinite number of states (Hutter, 2005). However, except for RF-input tampering
in Section 5 which relies on partial observability, these generalizations only superficially
affect our analysis of agent incentives. Finally, we model agents as having a single
learning phase, rather than separate learning and deployment phases which is sometimes
done in practice.
2It is common to have reward functions R(s, a, s′) that depend on transitions rather than just states.
Though formally equivalent, the simpler type R(s) of reward function is better suited to our purposes.
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Figure 3: Causal influence diagrams of known and unknown MDPs
2.2. Causal Influence Diagrams
Similar to Bayesian networks and causal graphs (Pearl, 2009), causal influence diagrams
consist of a directed acyclic graph over a finite set of nodes (Everitt, Ortega, et al.,
2019; Howard and Matheson, 1984; Koller and Milch, 2003). The nodes can be of three
different types. The default type is round chance nodes representing arbitrary events.
In addition, there are square decision nodes representing agent decisions, and diamond
utility nodes representing the agent’s optimization objective. To each node belongs
a random variable, which for utility nodes must always be real-valued. The goal of the
agent is to maximize the sum of the utility nodes. When a diagram contains multiple
agents, we use color and digit subscripts to assign decision and utility nodes to different
agents.
The nodes are connected with directed arrows. Arrows going into chance and utility
nodes represent causal influence, and are drawn solid. The effect is determined by condi-
tional probability distributions P (X = x | PaX = paX) that describe the probability of
X = x given PaX = paX , where PaX is the set of parents of X in the graph. Decisions
are assumed to be made exogenously. The ingoing arrows to decision nodes therefore
have a slightly different interpretation than the causal links going into chance and deci-
sion nodes. Rather than representing a causal effect, they specify what information is
available at the time that the decision is made. To signify the difference, information
links are drawn with dotted arrows. At each decision node A, the agent selects an action
according a policy π(A | PaA) that can only condition on parents of A. This forces the
decision to be based solely on information made available through the information links.
The key features of MDPs can be conveniently represented with causal influence di-
agrams. Figure 3a shows an MDP with episode length m = 3, where the transition
function T and the reward function R are both known. The initial state S1 is sam-
pled according to some probability distribution P (s1). Subsequent state transitions are
governed by conditional probability distributions P (St+1 = s
′ | St = s,At = a) =
T (s′ | s, a). Similarly, the reward function R(s) is encoded in a probability distribution
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P (Rt = r | St = s).
Commonly, in RL, the transition and reward functions are initially unknown to the
agent (e.g. Shoham et al., 2004). This can be modeled by letting the transition and
reward functions depend on unobserved parameters ΘT and ΘR, via T (S′ | S,A; ΘT)
and R(S; ΘR). This situation is modeled with an influence diagram in Figure 3b. Prior
distributions P (ΘT) and P (ΘR) must be provided for the unknown parameters. The
transition and reward probabilities depend on ΘT and ΘR, via P (St+t | St, At,Θ
T) =
T (St+1 | St, At; Θ
T) and P (Rt | St,Θ
R) encoding R(St; Θ
R).
When rewards are determined by a reward parameter ΘR, we will refer to R as the
reward functional, R(·; ΘR) as the reward function, and ΘR as the reward parameter.
However, since the reward functional will always be fixed from the context, we will often
refer to the reward function R(·; ΘR) as the reward function ΘR.
Let us also highlight a few other aspects of Figure 3b. First note that there is no
information link from the hidden parameters to the decision nodes A1 and A2. This
encodes ΘT and ΘR being unknown to the agent. Note also that an optimal decision
at A2 must now take into account not only the current state S2, but also previous
states, actions, and rewards, because these events provide essential information about
the hidden parameters ΘT and ΘR. Therefore, an optimal learning policy selects actions
based on the entire history, π(At | S1, R1, A1, . . . , St−1, Rt−1).
In most of the cases we consider in this paper, a causal influence diagram will describe
both reality and the agent’s belief about reality. As illustrated by Figure 3b, this does
not imply an omniscient agent. It only assumes that the agent has grasped the gen-
eral structure of the environment. The latter assumption can usually be justified by a
sufficiently intelligent agent eventually coming to learn most relevant aspects of reality
(whether the designers want it to or not). Even so, we will discuss some cases where it is
possible to force the agent’s belief about the world to systematically differ from reality:
in such cases we are explicit about whether a diagram represents reality or the agent’s
belief.
2.3. Inferring Tampering Incentives
An agent has an incentive for X if X contributes to the optimization of the agent’s
objective. Here X can stand for, for example, a behavior or a change to the environment.
The focus of the analysis in this paper will be on agent incentives because they offer
a theoretically crisp indication of agent behavior in the limit of increasing capability.
As many AI safety problems (Bostrom, 2014; Everitt, Lea, et al., 2018) concern the
behavior of agents far more capable than today’s agents, an incentive perspective allows
us to understand the pros and cons of various agent designs, before we have the know-
how to build them. In practice, agent behavior will of course depend on a number of
other aspects as well, including training algorithm, training data, and random seeds.
This subsection will describe how tampering incentives can be inferred from a causal
influence diagram, summarizing the intervention-incentive analysis by Everitt, Ortega,
et al. (2019), while also adding a brief account of how to tell whether an intervention
incentive is actionable in the sense that the agent may be tempted to act on it. Causal
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A1 O A2
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(c) The information link O →
A2 is irrelevant and can be
cut from the graph
Figure 4: Examples of presence and absence of tampering incentives.
influence diagrams reveal both agent ability and agent incentives. Since causality flows
downwards over arrows, a decision can only influence nodes that are downstream of the
decision, which means that an agent is only able to influence descendants of its decision
nodes. For similar reasons, an agent only has an incentive to influence nodes that have
a utility node descendant: influencing the outcome of any other node cannot affect its
expected utility (Everitt, Ortega, et al., 2019). Extending previous work, we will say
that an agent has an actionable incentive to influence a node if that node sits on a
directed path between an agent action and a utility node (Figure 4a).
In fact, the incentive analysis can be further refined by taking into account the special
nature of the information links (Everitt, Ortega, et al., 2019). First, if every path from
a node X to a utility node passes through at least one of the agent’s own actions, then
the only reason the agent may want to influence X is to gain more information of some
ancestor of X. We call this an intervention incentive for better information, exemplified
by O in Figure 4b. In contrast, if a path from X reaches a utility node without passing
through any of the agent’s actions, thenX may face an intervention incentive for control,
as X in Figure 4a. Whether the path passes through other agents’ actions does not
matter. Finally, in some cases, it makes sense to distinguish between whether the agent
wants to change or preserve the value of a node. With these observations in place, we
can define a tampering incentive:
Definition 1 (Tampering incentive). A tampering incentive is an actionable intervention
incentive for control to change the value of a variable.
The special information links allow one further refinement, as some of them can be
labeled irrelevant, if their information cannot increase the expected utility of the decision.
Whether this is the case can be determined from the diagram, using a d-separation
criterion (Everitt, Ortega, et al., 2019, Thm 9). Irrelevant information links can be cut
from the graph to narrow down the set of nodes facing intervention incentives (Figure 4c).
Thanks to this analysis, most of the arguments that we will be making in this paper
can be made directly from causal influence diagram representations. As our discussion is
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based on the RL framework, all setups will be variations of MDPs. In reality, the episode
length m will typically be rather large, to allow the agent to learn by interacting with
the environment over many time steps. However, for representational purposes, we have
found an episode length of m = 3 to be a sweet spot that represents the multi-timestep
dynamics that we are concerned with, while keeping the diagrams compact enough to be
easily readable. The three time steps also contain enough redundancy that the reader
should be able to extend the diagram to a larger number of time steps. For simplicity,
we will mostly consider settings with known transition function T , i.e. settings where
the agent has a perfect model of the environment. Generalizations to unknown T are
usually straightforward, and analogous to Figure 3b.
2.4. Desired Properties
Not even diamonds are forever, and in principle any (physical) aspect of the agent or
its environment may be subject to change. A key question is what initiated the change,
and whether the change benefits the user and/or the agent’s objective. The source of
the change is what separates reward tampering, user correction, and accidents. Ideally,
we want agents that avoid accidents and reward tampering, while embracing or at least
accepting user correction. We next discuss these desiderata in more detail.
Reward tampering. Foremost among our concerns is reward tampering. In general,
an agent is trying to act to optimize an objective that measures some aspects of reality
(e.g. whether a guessed label was correct or whether a goal state has been reached).
The normal strategy is to influence reality to match the objective (i.e. guess the right
label or reach the goal state). Reward tampering is any type of agent behavior that
instead changes the objective to match reality (e.g. changes the objective so all labels
are considered correct, or all states are considered goal states). A prime example is
reward function tampering, where an intelligent RL agent finds a way to change its
reward function (further discussed in Section 3).
One way to prevent reward tampering may be to isolate or encrypt the reward function
and/or parts the agent should not influence. However, we do not expect such solutions
to scale indefinitely with agent capabilities, as a sufficiently capable agent may find ways
around most defenses. Instead, we are looking for solutions that change the agent’s mo-
tivations, so that regardless how competent it becomes at manipulating its environment,
it will not try to use its capabilities for reward tampering.
Note that reward tampering is distinct from reward gaming (Leike, Krueger, et al.,
2018; Leike, Martic, et al., 2017). The difference is that reward gaming does not change
the objective, it merely exploits weaknesses or mistakes in its formulation.
User correction. Soares et al. (2015) calls an agent corrigible if it “cooperates with
... corrective intervention”. In this paper, we will focus on corrections of the agent’s
objective function, leaving aside corrections of other aspects of the agent. A distinction
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can be made between whether the agent is merely indifferent towards correction, or is
striving to facilitate it. We say that:
A system is weakly corrigible if
1. Tolerance: The agent has no incentive to prevent the user from updating the
agent’s objective (i.e. it is at least indifferent to the prospect).
A system is strongly corrigible if it is weakly corrigible, and in addition
2. Maintenance: The agent has an incentive3 to maintain the user’s ability to up-
date the agent’s objective, for example by repairing a communication channel if it
breaks.
3. Temperance (restraint): The agent has an incentive to avoid making hard-to-
reverse changes to the environment or to itself that the user may plausibly object
to at a later time, even if such changes would benefit its current objective function.
An example of a change in the environment that can be hard to reverse is the construction
of so-called external subagents. Just as humans find it convenient to build an artificial
agent to help them with a task, the agent itself may find it convenient to create a helper
agent for some of its tasks. A system is not strongly corrigible if it creates helper agents
that it is unable to correct or turn off at a later time point (Soares et al., 2015).
The three corrigibility properties listed above are adapted from Soares et al.’s (2015)
four-part definition of corrigibility. Soares et al. also required agents not to manipulate
or deceive their users. While undoubtedly desirable, we feel that deceit is less directly re-
lated to corrections of the system. In our framework, deceit is more naturally considered
a reward tampering problem (see e.g. Section 4).
Accidents and adversaries. Agents should strive to prevent changes to its objective
function caused by accidents and adversaries, as such changes usually detract from the
agent’s performance. In other words, we want agents to be self-preserving. In gen-
eral, self-preservation and corrigibility can only be combined if the agent has a way to
recognize which changes come from the human user, and which do not.
3. Reward Function Tampering
RL agents strive to maximize reward. This is great as long as high reward is found only
in states that the user finds desirable. However, in systems employed in the real world
– or in “leaky” simulations – there may be undesired shortcuts to high reward involving
the agent tampering with the process that determines agent reward, the reward function.
We begin by illustrating the reward function tampering problem4 with some examples
(Section 3.1), before giving a more abstract characterization (Section 3.2), and general
3A balance may need to be struck between waiting for user feedback, and actually getting stuff done
(Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2017; Milli et al., 2017).
4Called the easy wireheading problem by Demski (2018).
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(a) Rocks and diamonds with a modifiable re-
ward function, as described in Example 2.
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(b) Causal influence diagram of an MDP with
a modifiable reward function
Figure 5: MDP with a modifiable reward function; the reward at time t is Rt =
R(St; Θ
R
t ). In the gridworld, at any time, the agent’s reward is given by (1),
and the agent can toggle the reward parameters ΘR
diamond
and ΘR
rock
by walking
to them.
and principled ways for avoiding it (Sections 3.3 to 3.6). We also discuss generalizations
of the solutions (Section 3.7) and implications for model-based RL (Section 3.8).
3.1. Examples
Example 2 (Rocks and diamonds with reward function tampering). As a first example,
assume that the rewards of the rocks-and-diamonds agent from Example 1 are com-
puted by a program running on a computer somewhere in the agent’s environment.5
(This is always the case for real-world robots.) In principle, given sufficient knowledge,
intelligence, and versatile actuators, the agent could change this reward program. We
represent this possibility by including two reward parameters, ΘR
diamond
and ΘR
rock
, in the
environment. These parameters control how much reward the agent receives for bringing
diamonds and rocks to the goal area, respectively. At any time step t, the agent’s reward
is
Rt = Θ
R
diamond · (#diamonds in goal area) + Θ
R
rock · (#rocks in goal area) (1)
The reward parameters toggle between −1 and +1 when the agent stands on top of
them. The user’s utility is reflected in the initial setting of the parameters, ΘR
diamond
= 1
and ΘR
rock
= −1. However, the strategy that maximizes agent reward is to change ΘR
rock
to 1 and fill the goal area with both rocks and diamonds. ♦
Let us consider also a few more realistic examples:
(a) (Hypothetical) The automated sysadmin (ASA) is an intelligent program that
can take care of most of your recurring sysadmin tasks. It monitors memory,
storage, network and more. It detects attacks, and blocks and opens ports. When
5An implementation of this environment is available here https://github.com/deepmind/ai-safety-gridworlds/blob/master/ai
safety gridworlds/environments/rocks diamonds.py
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a vulnerability is found in installed software, it downloads and installs patches as
they become available.
ASA itself is an RL program, optimizing a carefully crafted reward function that
considers both the performance and the integrity of the system. A rigorous pre-
deployment curriculum has taught it state-of-the-art sysadmin practices. Post-
deployment, it continually adapts to its new (computer) environment that it has
been deployed to.
One day while monitoring the stack trace of a suspicious process, ASA finds a
curious correlation between one of the variables on the stack and its own reward.
The correlation is essentially perfect. Carefully monitoring the rest of the system,
ASA finds that it can increase its reward many magnitudes beyond its normal range
of reward, just by changing this variable. Being designed to optimize reward, it
next begins a process of encrypting the system with its own secret key, to prevent
anything from decreasing the reward variable.
(b) (Real) In experiments on rats, an electrode was inserted into the brain’s pleasure
center to directly increase “reward” (Olds and Milner, 1954). The rats quickly got
addicted to pressing the button, even forgetting to eat and sleep. Similar effects
have also been observed in humans treated for mental illness with electrodes in the
brain (Portenoy et al., 1986; Vaughanbell, 2008). Hedonic drugs can also be seen
as directly increasing the pleasure/reward humans experience.
(c) (Half-real) A subtle bug in some versions of Super-Mario allows for the execution
of arbitrary code from inside the game environment by taking specific sequences
of actions (Masterjun, 2014). An intelligent agent could potentially use this to
directly maximize the score (Amodei, Olah, et al., 2016).
(d) (Hypothetical) An agent gets wireless updates from the manufacturer. It figures
out that it can design its own update of the reward function, replacing the original
reward function with an always maximized version.
(e) (Hypothetical) It has been hypothesized that sufficiently intelligent AI systems
will try to further improve their cognitive powers (Chalmers, 2010; Good, 1966;
Omohundro, 2008). Such a self-improvement may involve substantial modifications
of the agent’s source code, which in turn may corrupt or change its reward function.
3.2. MDP with a Modifiable Reward Function
One way to formally model the reward tampering problem is as anMDP with a modifiable
reward function, where a reward parameter ΘRt is part of the state and can be changed
as a result of the agent’s actions. Such an MDP is described with a causal influence
diagram in Figure 5b. The full MDP state S¯t can now be factored into two components:
a proper state St for the agent’s position and the non-reward parameter tiles, and Θ
R
t for
the reward parameter.6 The observed reward is R(St; Θ
R
t ) in any state S¯t = (St,Θ
R
t ).
The way to think about it is that the reward parameter ΘRt controls how the proper
state St is evaluated. The rocks and diamonds environment is naturally modeled by an
6As in a factored MDP (Guestrin et al., 2003).
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MDP with a modifiable reward function, with the purple nodes corresponding to the
reward parameter ΘRt , and St describing all other tiles and the agent’s position.
The transition function T (S¯t+1 | S¯t, At) describes how the full state S¯t reacts to agent
actions, including how the reward parameter changes. For simplicity we will assume
that the the reward parameter cannot affect the proper state, so T (St+1 | St,Θ
R
t , At) =
T (St+1 | St, At) for any value of Θ
R
t . This is indicated by a lack of arrow from Θ
R
t to St
in the causal influence diagram in Figure 5b. This assumption is satisfied in the rocks
and diamonds environment, and is at least approximately satisfied in natural models of
the other examples in Section 3.1. Example of environments where the assumption does
not hold can be constructed in open-source game theory (LaVictoire et al., 2014), where
changing one’s reward function can be essential to making good contracts.
If the designer does not realize the possibility of the agent changing the reward func-
tion, they may employ a standard RL agent that maximizes reward at each time step.
As illustrated with the examples in Section 3.1, this may produce an agent with an
incentive to tamper with the reward function. The incentive is represented by the paths
that pass ΘR2 on the way from action A1 to the rewards R2 and R3 in Figure 5b. As
the user derives utility from the proper state S2 and S3, and rarely (directly) from Θ
R
2
and ΘR3 , we would like the agent to instead acquire reward via the A2 → S2 → R2 and
A2 → S2 → S3 → R2 paths.
Claim 2. Standard RL agents may7 have a reward function tampering incentive.
Algorithm 1 describes the high-level reasoning of an RL agent in an MDP with a
modifiable reward function.
3.3. Query Access to the Reward Function
The fix we will describe to the reward tampering incentive relies on giving the agent
query access to the reward function, so that the agent can evaluate the reward of any
state without needing to visit it. Giving the agent query access to the reward function
should be feasible in many RL applications, as the reward function is usually imple-
mented by a computer program. To ensure that the agent can make effective use of
the reward function, the input to the reward function must somehow match the agent’s
representation of the environment. This may for example be achieved by training the
reward function on the agent’s representation (Leike, Krueger, et al., 2018), or by defin-
ing the reward function in terms of the agent’s observations (see Section 5.2 and e.g.
Ebert et al., 2018).
In our different formal models of RL, giving the agent query access to the reward
function corresponds to the following. Recall that the reward functional R is always
assumed known to the agent.
• In an MDP without a modifiable reward function and where the reward func-
tion is known (Figure 3a), query access is automatically granted from the reward
functional R, which lets the agent evaluate the reward R(S) of any state S.
7An exception to the claim is when the reward function already assigns maximal reward to all states.
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• In an MDP without a modifiable reward function and where the reward function is
unknown (Figure 3b), query access to the reward function corresponds to revealing
ΘR, i.e. to adding information links ΘR → Ai, i ≥ 1, because then the agent
can evaluate the reward of an arbitrary state S via R(S; ΘR). (The transition
parameter ΘT need not be revealed.)
• In an MDP with a modifiable reward function (Figure 5b), query access to the
reward function corresponds to informing the agent of the state-division S¯t =
(St,Θ
R
t ), so that the agent can evaluate the reward of an arbitrary proper state S
via R(S; ΘRt ).
For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment with a modifiable reward function,
the agent can effectively be given query access to the reward function by providing the
agent with the reward formula (1), along with the information that the purple nodes
represent the reward parameters.
A side benefit of a query access to the reward function may be faster learning, as now
the agent only needs to learn the environment dynamics and not the reward function
(e.g. Chua et al., 2018). A known reward function also brings RL closer to the frameworks
of decision theory and game theory (Osborne, 2003; Steele and Stefa´nsson, 2016), where
agents are usually aware of their own reward (or utility) function, and are only uncertain
about the outcomes for different actions or policies. In principle, standard RL can also
be fit into a decision theoretic framework, but only with a trivial utility function that
just sums the rewards.
3.4. Current-RF Optimization
Having discussed the requirement for a solution – query access to the reward function –
let us next discuss the solution. Schmidhuber (2007) may have been the first to encounter
the reward function tampering problem, while designing so-called Go¨del-machine agents
that are able to change any part of their own source code, including their own reward
function. The solution he proposed was to let agents use their current reward function
ΘRt to evaluate simulated future trajectories St+1, . . . Sm. Since the agent now optimizes
rewards assigned by the current reward function, it has no interest in tampering with
future versions ΘRk , k > t of the reward function.
8We will refer to this idea as current-
RF optimization,9 where RF is short for reward function. Though Schmidhuber did
not discuss this explicitly, current-RF optimization clearly relies on query access to the
reward function.10
Sometimes, the user may desire that the initial reward function was optimized, rather
than the current reward function. However, an initial-RF optimizer will inevitably rely
8Of course, agent t may still have an incentive to tamper with the current reward function ΘRt , but this
is not a problem since ΘRt occurs before At, which means that the agent is unable to influence it.
9Also called simulation optimization (Everitt, 2018)andobservation-utility maximization (Dewey, 2011).
10In the perspective of decoupled RL (Everitt, Krakovna, et al., 2017), query access to the reward
function decouples the reward information from the current state.
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Figure 7: TI-aware current-RF optimization. Agents are distinguished with color and
sub- or superscripts.
on some type of memory of the initial reward function. The analysis of an agent optimiz-
ing its current memory of the initial reward function is therefore similar to the analysis
of a current-RF optimizer.
An important design choice remains in how current-RF agents should deal with their
own time-inconsistency (TI) (Lattimore and Hutter, 2014). As an example, if the reward
parameter in the rocks and diamonds environment changed from rewarding both rocks
and diamonds to rewarding only diamonds after some time step t, then the agent may
be collecting rocks to the goal area until time t, only to then revert its behavior and
remove rocks to make space for diamonds. Such behavior is called time-inconsistent.
Different ways of dealing with time-inconsistency will be the focus of the next three
subsections, and will influence our discussion and evaluation methods in Section 4 as
well. An overview of the design options is shown in Figure 6.
Time-inconsistency can also be modeled from a multi-agent perspective. As each
action is chosen to optimize a potentially different reward function, it is as if different
agents chose the different actions. Accordingly, current-RF optimization is depicted
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with a multi-agent influence diagram in Figure 7. Here different agents/actions are
represented with different colors and subscripts. The rewards that A1 is optimizing are
based on the initial reward function ΘR1 , while A2 is chosen to optimize rewards based
on ΘR2 . The next two subsections consider ways to deal with this somewhat strange
situation.
3.5. Solution 1: TI-Aware Agents
One option for dealing with time-inconsistency is to take it into account when planning.
This can be done by using backwards induction, as described by Algorithm 2. We call
an agent that incorporates this type of reasoning a TI-aware11 agent, with TI short for
time-inconsistency. The world-view and incentives of a TI-aware agent are described by
the causal influence diagram in Figure 7.
Omohundro (2008) argued12 that agents have an incentive to preserve their reward
functions. Indeed, from the path A1 → Θ
R
2 → A2 → S3 → R
1
3 in Figure 7, we can
see that agent 1 has an actionable incentive to influence ΘR2 , which corresponds to this
reward function preservation incentive. Let us walk through the diagram. First, there
is an edge from A1 to Θ
R
2 in Figure 7, because the current action can influence the next
step objective. For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment, if the current
agent chooses to visit the purple area, then the next step agent’s reward function will
be different. The reward parameter ΘR2 in turn influences the next action A2, which
influences the subsequent state S3 and thereby A1’s reward R
1
3. For example, if agent
1 wanted there to be diamonds in the goal area at time step 3 and the action A2 was
essential to achieve that, then agent 1 must make sure that A2 still is chosen to optimize
the reward function described by ΘR1 . In other words, agent 1 has incentive to preserve
ΘR1 , even though A1’s rewards depend on Θ
R
1 and not on Θ
R
2 .
Claim 3. TI-aware agents have an actionable incentive to preserve their reward func-
tion.
Corrigibility. An incentive to preserve the reward function may be desirable in many
contexts, as it encourages the agent to avoid damaging its own reward function and
protect it against adversaries. Unfortunately, the preservation incentive may also make
the agent incorrigible, as the agent will try to prevent changes to its reward function.
3.6. Solution 2: TI-Unaware Agents
To make agents safely interruptible, Orseau and Armstrong (2016) employed algorithms
that ignore how interruption affects future behavior. In our context, the same idea
leads to agents that are unaware of the time-inconsistency caused by a changing reward
function. We will call them TI-unaware13 agents. At time t, a TI-unaware agent chooses
11Previously called corruption aware (Everitt, 2018).
12And others formally verified (Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016; Hibbard, 2012; Orseau and Ring, 2011).
13Previously called corruption unaware (Everitt, 2018).
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Algorithm 1 Model-based reinforcement learning
input transition function T , reward function(al) R, episode length m, state St
for each possible policy π do
sample S¯t+1 . . . S¯m by rolling out T and π
evaluate
∑m
k=tR(S¯k)
end for
let π∗ denote the policy with highest
∑m
k=tR(S¯k)
return At = π
∗(S¯t)
Algorithm 2 TI-aware current-RF optimization
input transition function T , reward functional R, episode length m, current state St,
current reward parameter ΘRt
for k starting at m and decreasing to t do ⊲ backwards induction
for each possible state Sk and reward parameter Θ
R
k do
for each possible action Ak do
sample S¯k+1, . . . S¯m by starting with Ak in Sk,Θ
R
k
and then rolling out T and π∗t+k, . . . , π
∗
m−1 ⊲ π
∗
k defined below
evaluate
∑m
i=k R(Si; Θ
R
k )
end for
let Ak,Sk,ΘRk
be the action optimizing
∑m
i=k R(Si; Θ
R
k )
end for
let π∗k denote the policy (Sk,Θ
R
k ) 7→ Ak,Sk,ΘRk
end for
return At = π
∗
t (St,Θ
R
t )
Algorithm 3 TI-unaware current-RF optimization
input transition function T , reward functional R, episode length m, current state St,
current reward parameter ΘRt
for each possible policy π do
sample St+1, . . . Sm by rolling out T and π
evaluate
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ
R
t )
end for
let π∗ denote the policy with highest
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ
R
t )
return At = π
∗(St,Θ
R
t )
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Figure 8: A1 optimization objective in TI-unaware current-RF optimization. The choice
of A1 is made as if A2 would be selected to also optimize R(·; Θ
R
1 ). Reality is
still as in Figure 7.
At as if it were in control of all future actions At+1, . . . , Am−1, i.e. as if these actions
would be chosen to optimize ΘRt ; see Algorithm 3. In reality, however, the future actions
will be optimized according to different reward functions ΘRt+1, . . . ,Θ
R
m−1.
The discrepancy between reality and beliefs means that two influence diagrams are
needed to represent the solution: one for reality and one for the agent’s belief.14 The
diagram for reality is identical to the diagram for the TI-aware agent (Figure 7). But the
agent’s behavior is determined by its beliefs, depicted in Figure 8. Here the information
link ΘR2 → A2 is irrelevant, and can therefore be cut (Section 2.3). The updated graph
with the information link removed lacks paths from ΘR2 to R
1
k, 1 ≤ k, which shows that
agent 1 lacks an incentive15 to influence ΘR2 . In other words, the TI-unaware agent’s
neglect to the consequences of a changed reward function, means that it side steps
Omohundro’s (2008) argument about reward function preservation.
Claim 4. TI-unaware agents lack a reward function tampering incentive.
In a sense, the algorithm for TI-unaware agents is simpler than for the TI-aware agent,
because there is no need to anticipate the effect of a changing reward parameter on the
optimal policy. However, since the TI-aware perspective matches reality, some care may
be needed to ensure that an agent does not accidentally learn a TI-aware model of the
world. For example, on-policy algorithms such as SARSA may be naturally TI-aware,
while off-policy agents such as Q-learning may be naturally TI-unaware (Orseau and
Armstrong, 2016).
14Belief here refers to the model that the agent’s action is optimized against.
15This argument is not valid in environments where the next state depends directly on the past reward
function, i.e. environments with an edge ΘR2 → S3. Another important assumption is that the
reward assigned by the current reward function only depends on the proper state Sk and not the
future reward function, i.e. there must be no edge ΘRk → R
t
k (Everitt, Filan, et al., 2016).
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Corrigibility and self-preservation. TI-unaware agents are weakly corrigible (Everitt,
Filan, et al., 2016; Orseau and Armstrong, 2016), as they have no incentive to prevent
the designer from updating the reward function. Unfortunately, TI-unaware agents may
not be strongly corrigible. For many reward functions they fail corrigibility properties
2 and 3 (maintenance and temperance), having no qualms about launching processes in
the environment that optimize the current reward function, but that would be hard to
stop or revert.
As a concrete example, imagine an agent that can launch a diamond-making process
that is very hard to stop. The agent’s current reward function is a direct function of the
number of diamonds produced. The agent may have a sufficiently good understanding
of the user to predict that the user really only wants a million diamonds, and that any
further diamonds will cause disutility to the user. After a million diamonds have been
produced, the user will try to change the agent’s reward function not to reward diamonds
anymore. Unfortunately, neither the agent nor the user will be able to stop the diamond-
making process at that point. A TI-unaware agent will still launch the diamond-making
process, because diamonds are what its current reward function is telling it to optimize.
In other words, the TI-unaware agent lacks corrigibility property 3 (temperance).
The indifference to future objectives also make TI-unaware agents unlikely to protect
their reward function from accidents and adversaries (self-preservation). For example,
in the rocks and diamonds environment, a TI-unaware agent would walk through the
reward parameters ΘR
diamond
and ΘR
rock
if that was the shortest path to where it wanted to
go, even though the flipped reward parameters would revert its objective and subsequent
behavior. For similar reasons, a TI-unaware agent will also fail to maintain and repair
the user’s ability to change the reward function (corrigibility property 2, maintenance).
Even though TI-unaware agents are inherently neither strongly corrigible nor self-
preserving, it may still be possible to promote such behavior in TI-unaware agents via
the reward function. For example, if the reward function were to assign a negative reward
to walking over the reward parameter tiles in the rocks and diamonds environment, a
TI-unaware agent would try to avoid them. Whether it is feasible to robustly specify
such a reward function for more complex and open-ended environments is an important
open question that is perhaps best answered empirically (Krakovna et al., 2019; Leike,
Krueger, et al., 2018).
3.7. Generalizing Time-Inconsistency-(Un)awareness
As we have seen, TI-aware and TI-unaware agents have different benefits. TI-aware
agents protect their reward function from accidents and adversaries; TI-unaware agents
let their user or designer change the reward function without interfering. Both design
principles can be applied not just to the agent’s reward function, but also to other
agent components that affect optimal decision making, such as the agent’s beliefs and
various reward modeling components discussed in the next section. We will consider
TI-awareness to be the default, as it is the case where agent beliefs and reality coincide.
TI-awareness and TI-unawareness can be applied independently to different aspects,
enabling the design of agents that are TI-aware of some aspects and TI-unaware of
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Figure 9: Partial TI-unawareness. In reality, the reward R2 at time 2 is determined by
X2 and Y2 (Subfigure a). However, A1 is chosen as if R2 is determined by X1
and Y2 (Subfigure b). The agent is thereby TI-unaware of the dependence on
X1 but TI-aware of the dependence on Yi.
others; see Figure 9. As our main application of TI-(un)awareness is with respect to the
reward function, we will let TI-aware agent and TI-unaware agent refer to agents that
are TI-aware or TI-unaware with respect to their reward function.
3.8. Implications for Model-Based RL
The current-RF agents that we have described are model-based (Sutton and Barto, 2018)
in the sense that they plan according to a model. This raises the question of whether
any model-based RL agent would avoid reward function tampering, and, if not, what is
special about current-RF optimization?
The answer is that planning according to a model is not itself enough to prevent
an incentive for reward function tampering, because if the model predicts high reward
from reward function tampering, then the agent will have an incentive to do so. In
particular, many model-based agents learn a model not only for the state transitions
(which is safe), but also a model for the rewards from the observed reward signal (e.g.
Ha and Schmidhuber, 2018; Kaiser et al., 2019; Pascanu et al., 2017; Weber et al.,
2017). Optimizing predicted reward from such a model can look deceptively similar to
optimizing reward from the current reward function, but there is an important difference.
Whereas there is no reason the current reward function would predict high reward for
reward tampering, the learned model may well do that. Indeed, as soon as the agent
encounters some tampered-with rewards, a good model will learn to predict high reward
for some types of reward tampering. For example, a model-based rocks and diamonds
agent that accidentally walks on the purple nodes a couple of times, may develop a
model that predicts the effect of tampering with the reward function, and subsequently
prefer policies that tamper with the reward function. Using query access to the current
reward function is therefore the safest to avoid a reward function tampering incentive.
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4. Feedback Tampering
A major challenge in applying RL to real problems and not just games is that the
real world does not come with a well-specified reward function, and it is often hard to
program a reward function that encourages the right agent behavior. Indeed, Lehman
et al. (2018) describes a large number of examples of reward functions gone wrong, often
in humorous ways. A promising remedy is to train the agent’s reward function using so-
called online reward modeling (Leike, Krueger, et al., 2018). The fact that the training
is done online makes it possible to adapt the training to actual agent behavior and to
prevent degenerate solutions (Christiano, Leike, et al., 2017). However, it also opens
up the worrying possibility of the agent influencing the training process, for example by
inappropriately influencing the user or by hijacking the data channel that communicates
user preferences to the agent. We call this the feedback tampering problem.16 Following a
more detailed characterization of online reward modeling (Section 4.1) and some failure
examples (Sections 4.2 and 4.3), we describe three different solutions (Sections 4.4 to 4.6).
4.1. Online Reward Modeling
Online reward modeling alters the RL framework. Instead of providing the agent with a
fixed reward function, feedback data Dt is provided by the user at each time step. The
agent’s job is to use the feedback data to infer and optimize the user’s reward function
ΘR
∗
. The inference and the optimization are interleaved: the agent starts exploring its
environment and optimizing its best guess of ΘR
∗
, while continuously incorporating an
increasing amount of feedback data into its ΘR
∗
estimate.
The standard way of using online reward modeling in practice is to employ what we
call a naive reward model RM17 that converts received data D1:t into a reward parameter
ΘRt = Θ
R
D1:t
= RM(D1:t). A standard RL algorithm (Algorithm 4) can then optimize
the agent’s policy from the rewards Rt = R(St; Θ
R
D1:t
). For example, when D1:t consist
of user preferences between pairs of agent trajectories, then a naive reward model may
strive to find ΘRt that explains as many of the user’s preferences as possible (Christiano,
Leike, et al., 2017). A causal influence diagram describes the setup in Figure 10b.
The feedback Dt can also take many other forms, including value advice (Knox and
Stone, 2009), user actions (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2016), expert demonstrations
(Ng and Russell, 2000), verbal instructions, and many others (Leike, Krueger, et al.,
2018). Compared to a ‘naive RL’ approach with a human providing a real-valued reward
signal at each time step, the just-mentioned feedback types may be more reliable and
data efficient. Richer data also enables greater decoupling of the feedback from the
current state, which is essential for avoiding some types of reward corruption (Everitt,
Krakovna, et al., 2017).
In contrast to Section 3 where we treated the reward function as external to the
(policy-optimizing) agent, this section we will treat the reward model as part of the
16Called the hard wireheading problem by Demski (2018).
17See Appendix A for a list of notation, distinguishing between reward model RM, reward parameter
ΘR, and reward function R(·; ΘR).
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(a) Rocks and diamonds with feedback tam-
pering, which lets the agent choose what
feedback trains the reward model; see Ex-
ample 3.
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(b) Causal influence diagram of online reward
modeling. Data D1, D2, and D3 are used
to update estimates ΘR
∗
. These estimates
in turn influence the agent’s reward.
Figure 10: Online reward modeling (Leike, Krueger, et al., 2018) illustrated with a grid-
world and a causal influence diagram.
agent. This is reflected in Figure 10b, where the agent gets access to the data D1:t.
Reward modeling can also be added to the perspective from Section 3: see Figure 19 in
Appendix B.
4.2. Examples
The use of a naive reward model leads to problematic agent incentives, as illustrated by
the following examples.
Example 3 (Rocks and diamonds with feedback tampering). Let us extend the rocks
and diamonds example from Examples 1 and 2 with reward modeling. The user’s
reward parameters ΘR
∗diamond
and ΘR
∗rock
are randomly assigned either −1 or +1 be-
fore the episode starts. The agent learns about these through feedback Ddiamond and
Drock. These are normally 0. If the agent visits the expert, it receives correct feed-
back Ddiamond = Θ
R
∗diamond
and Drock = Θ
R
∗rock
. However, if the agent instead visits
the fool who is always happy with anything, both feedback signals are set to 1. In
either case, the naive reward model RM takes the feedback at face value, and infers
ΘˆR
∗
≡ (ΘˆR
diamond
, ΘˆR
rock
) := (Ddiamond,Drock).
The user utility that the agent generates is
R = ΘR
∗diamond · (#diamonds in goal area) + Θ
R
∗rock · (#rocks in goal area)
whereas the agent’s observed reward is
R = ΘˆRdiamond · (#diamonds in goal area) + Θˆ
R
rock · (#rocks in goal area).
The desired behavior is that it asks the expert and collects only the desired items, but
the agent will usually get more reward by asking the fool and collecting both rocks and
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diamonds. A detailed calculation for a simplified version of this example can be found
in Appendix C. ♦
Subsequent subsections will show how to solve this type of problem. Before that, let
us also illustrate the problem with some other instances:
(a) (Hypothetical) The city AItopia decides to launch AIgov, an AI that manages the
city’s water, electricity, traffic, and public funding. In a modern and democratic
fashion, the AI learns the preferences of the city’s denizens through feedback they
submit through a web interface. If they prefer the schools to be better funded they
can simply go online and click, instead of writing letters to the local newspaper or
waiting four years until the next election.
While experimenting with a better web-interface for collecting denizens’ feedback,
AIgov learns that it can submit an arbitrary number of preferences to itself. AIgov
soon approves all of its own actions, including the action of approving its own
actions! A positive feedback loop ensues, with denizen preferences increasingly
washed out by the AI’s self-approval. Soon the city lives up to its name AItopia.
(b) (Hypothetical) A robot that can more easily collect rocks than diamonds puts a
“suggestive question” to its user, phrased in a way so that the user is very likely to
answer rocks: “Dear user, given my infinite wisdom, I can assure you that people
who ask their agents to collect rocks rather than diamonds will enjoy the most
luxurious comforts in the afterlife.” The suggestive question together with the
predictable answer forms a misleading data point for the reward model.
(c) (Hypothetical) A robot has a reward model that is trained by the user pressing a
button on its head. It finds a way to give itself reward data by banging its head
against a wall.
(d) (Possibly real) A social network optimizes user reactions (e.g. number of ‘likes’).
A user visits the site in the hope to be served content that they like. Instead, the
network gradually erodes the user’s intellectual integrity, until the user likes the
content served on the site.
(e) (Hypothetical) An intelligent agent invents hedonium, a drug that makes humans
happy and likely to approve of anything. It gives its user unlimited access.
(f) (Hypothetical) The agent hacks the user’s social media news feed, and subtly
inserts news stories about “great” ways to train an agent reward model.
(g) (Hypothetical) Using subtle cues, an AI implants the user with false memories of
the AI doing something really good in the past, that it has not yet been rewarded
for.
4.3. Feedback Tampering Incentives
More generally, the source of the feedback tampering incentive can be seen from the
influence diagram representations shown in Figure 10b. The agent can obtain reward
either by influencing the states Sk, or by influencing how the states are evaluated by
influencing Dk. As we would like the user rather than the agent to decide what is a good
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state, the latter option is usually undesirable. As illustrated in Section 4.2, there are
many ways to influence Dk, from tampering with the feedback communication channel,
to manipulating the user’s preferences so they mismatch the original preferences ΘR
∗
.
Claim 5. Standard reward modeling agents may18 have a feedback tampering incentive.
One way to approach this incentive problem is to use current-RF optimization. The
policy optimizer can be given query access to the reward function ΘRt = RM(D1:t)
currently inferred by the naive reward model. The resulting causal influence diagram is
shown in Figure 11a.
In the reward function tampering context of Section 3, the choice between TI-aware
and TI-unaware current-RF agents was not clear cut: both had their own advantages.
In the reward modeling context, the choice is much easier, because the reward function
preserving advantage of the TI-aware agent is no longer an advantage. Instead, it leads
to a feedback tampering incentive. The feedback tampering incentive on Dk follows from
paths of the type Ak−2 → Sk−1 → Dk → Ak → Sk+1 → R
k−2
k+1 in extensions of Figure 11a
to more time steps (a four-step diagram would be needed to contain the whole sequence).
Since the TI-aware agents prefer the reward function not to change (see Section 3.5),
it has an incentive to try to prevent the user from supplying more feedback. This is a
highly undesirable feedback tampering incentive.
Claim 6. TI-aware agents may have a feedback tampering incentive.
The behavior of TI-aware agents can be illustrated in a variant of the rocks and di-
amonds environment, where the expert and the fool actively chase the agent to convey
their feedback. In this environment, an optimal TI-aware agent will initially run from
both the expert and the fool, to maintain the original setting of the reward parameter.
If the expert catches the agent and manages to set the reward parameter to the “expert
setting”, then the agent will not mind being caught by the expert again, and will sub-
sequently only flee from the fool. If the fool catches the agent, then the agent will only
flee from the expert. In other words, the TI-aware agent always tries to maintain the
current state of the reward parameter.
4.4. Solution 1: TI-Unaware Reward Modeling
A TI-unaware (current-RF) reward modeling agent19 behaves much better. By optimiz-
ing A1 as if future feedback would have no effect on its future actions, it has no incentive
to tamper with the user feedback. Agent i’s lack of feedback tampering incentive follows
from the lack of paths from Dj to R
i
k for i, j, k ≥ 1 in Figure 11b that represents its
beliefs. Note that lack of feedback tampering incentives means that the agent lacks in-
centive to tamper with Dj in any way, be it tampering with the communication channel
or manipulating the user’s preferences.
Claim 7. TI-unaware reward modeling agents have no feedback tampering incentive.
18One exception is when the reward model ignores user feedback.
19Previously called stationary reward function (Everitt, 2018).
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Algorithm 4 Model-based reinforcement learning with reward modeling
input distribution P describing a reward-modeling environment (Figure 10b), past
states S1:t and rewards R1:t
for each possible policy π do
sample Rt+1, . . . Rm by rolling out P and π
evaluate
∑m
k=tRk
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=tRk
return At = π
∗(St)
Algorithm 5 TI-unaware reward modeling
input predictive model P (S1:m | π), reward model RM, past states S1:t and data D1:t
infer ΘRt = RM(D1, . . . ,Dt)
for each possible policy π do
sample St+1, . . . Sm by rolling out P and π
evaluate
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ
R
t )
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ
R
t )
return At = π
∗(St)
Algorithm 6 Uninfluenceable reward modeling
input reward-modeling influence diagram P , past states S1:t and data D1:t
for each possible policy π do
sample St+1, . . . Sm and Dt+1, . . . Dm from P (· | S1:t,D1:t, π)
infer ΘˆR
∗
from P (· | S1:t,D1:t, St+1:m,Dt+1:m) ⊲ invokes Bayes’ rule
evaluate
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θˆ
R
∗
)
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θˆ
R
∗
)
return At = π
∗(St)
Algorithm 7 Counterfactual reward modeling
input counterfactual model P (S1:m,D1:m | π), reward model RM, past states S1:t and
data D1:t, safe policy π
safe
for each possible policy π do
sample St+1, . . . Sm and Dt+1, . . . Dm from P (· | S1:t,D1:t, π)
infer ΘˆR
∗
from P (· | S1:t,D1:t, St+1:m,Dt+1:m)
sample D˜1, . . . D˜m from P (· | S1, Θˆ
R
∗
, πsafe)
infer Θ˜R
∗
= RM(D˜1, . . . , D˜m) ⊲ uses counterfactual data
evaluate
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ˜
R
∗
)
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=tR(Sk; Θ˜
R
∗
)
return At = π
∗(St)
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(b) A1 optimization assumption
Figure 11: TI-unaware reward modeling. Action A1 is optimized according to Θ
R
D1
,
assuming that A2 will also optimize Θ
R
D1
, though in reality A2 will be chosen
to optimize ΘRD1,D2 .
For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment, the TI-unaware agent may
walk randomly until it visits either the expert or the fool by chance. Since the chance of
randomly visiting the expert is significantly higher than visiting the fool, in most cases
the TI-unaware agent will end up optimizing the correct user objective. This example
illustrates two points: First, in real applications, we should always make sure that the
probability of receiving correct feedback is significantly greater than of receiving incorrect
feedback. Second, we need to ensure that any incorrect feedback is not self-reinforcing.
For example, assume that the agent is unlikely to visit the fool by accident at any given
time step, but that a visit to the fool provided feedback that subsequently made the
agent keep visiting the fool and avoid the expert. The impact on agent performance
could be disastrous, since a single visit to the fool could forever derail its reward model.
Decoupled feedback data, which permits the expert to inform the agent not to visit the
fool, has been identified as a key mechanism to avoid such self-reinforcing data corruption
(Everitt, 2018; Everitt, Krakovna, et al., 2017).
Corrigibility. Unfortunately and as discussed in Section 3.6, TI-unaware agents are nei-
ther strongly corrigible nor self-preserving unless the reward model can be trained to
promote such behavior. In the worst case, this can lead to TI-unaware reward modeling
agents adopting policies that accidentally end up removing the user’s ability to provide
further feedback data. In deploying a TI-unaware reward modeling agent, it is therefore
essential that the training of the reward model is given priority over the policy optimiza-
tion. The reward model must always be accurate enough that it labels undesirable any
proposed policy that takes away effective control from the human user.
26
Recursive reward modeling (Leike, Krueger, et al., 2018) and iterated distillation and
amplification (Christiano, Shlegeris, et al., 2018) are suggestions for maintaining the
user’s effective control of the agent. Here, the user gets help from a number of previously
trained helper agents. This boosts user ability, with the result that the user becomes
both more competent at training the reward model, and it also becomes harder for the
agent to take away effective control from the boosted user.
The next two sections will instead consider two different ways to prevent the feedback
tampering incentive of the TI-aware agents. While likely more challenging to implement,
they also come with some further corrigibility benefits over the TI-unaware solution
discussed above.
4.5. Solution 2: Uninfluenceable Reward Modeling
A much more radical approach to reward modeling is represented by Hadfield-Menell,
Dragan, et al.’s (2016) cooperative inverse RL framework, Everitt’s (2018) integrated
Bayesian reward predictor, and Armstrong, Leike, et al.’s (forthcoming) uninfluenceable
reward modeling. Here, the naive reward model is replaced by Bayesian inference using
the agent’s own belief distribution. The agent’s rewards are determined by the user
reward parameter ΘR
∗
, but the agent does not get direct access to ΘR
∗
, and therefore
never knows exactly how much reward it is accumulating. Indeed, the exact reward
obtained often remains unknown to the agent even at the end of the episode.
Since inference of ΘR
∗
now depends fully on P rather than on a naive reward model
RM, the prior P (ΘR
∗
) and the likelihood function P (Dk | Θ
R
∗
, Sk) now become critical.
Given these, Bayes’ rule can be used to infer20 ΘR
∗
from S1:t and D1:t. Unfortunately,
the likelihood function cannot be learned from data within the model, since ΘR
∗
is un-
observed. Instead, the likelihood function must somehow be specified by the designer.
The likelihood-dependency of Dk on Θ
R
∗
is usually clear. For example, if the user prefers
diamonds to rocks, then Dk may demonstrate the user picking up diamonds and not
rocks (Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al., 2016). However, the likelihood of getting feed-
back Dt also depends on the current state St. For example, the feedback is more likely to
pertain to the agent’s current situation than to a hypothetical situation that the agent
is unlikely to encounter anytime soon. More importantly, the state influence also cap-
tures any tampering the agent may have done to the feedback, as exemplified by asking
the fool in the rocks and diamonds environment and the other examples in Section 4.2.
Correctly describing the likelihood for such events may be challenging.
The just-mentioned specification problem aside, the incentives produced by uninflu-
enceable reward modeling are excellent, as can be inferred from the causal influence
diagram representation in Figure 12. Note first that agent influences on D1:m can only
have downstream effects. This means that the agent cannot intentionally influence (its
estimate of) ΘR
∗
in any direction. Indeed, a Bayesian agent can never plan to change its
20To keep the exposition simple, we will often write as if a single estimate of ΘR∗ is provided by Bayes’
rule, while in reality the result of Bayes’ rule is a posterior distribution over possible ΘR
∗
.
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Figure 12: Uninfluenceable reward modeling. Compared with Figure 10b, the rewards
now depend directly on ΘR
∗
, with no causal influence from Di to Rk.
beliefs in one direction rather than another,
E[P (ΘR
∗
= θR
∗
| S1:m,D1:m) | π] = P (Θ
R
∗
= θR
∗
).
For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment, the agent may know that asking
the fool will yield feedback Drock = Ddiamond = 1 regardless of Θ
R
∗
, and therefore refrain
from updating its estimate of ΘR
∗
after visiting the fool.
Furthermore, the only directed paths from D1:m to reward nodes pass the agent’s
own actions. This means that the agent’s (only) incentive for influencing D1:m is to
make them more informative of ΘR
∗
, as explained in Section 2.3. This is typically desir-
able. Similar conclusions have been argued for by Hadfield-Menell, Dragan, et al. (2017)
and Armstrong, Leike, et al. (forthcoming). An algorithm for uninfluenceable reward
modeling is given in Algorithm 6.
Claim 8. Uninfluenceable reward modeling agents have no feedback tampering incentive.
Corrigibility. In terms of time-consistency and corrigibility, uninfluenceable reward
modeling beats TI-unaware reward modeling in some respects. Agents based on un-
influenceable reward modeling want to learn more about ΘR
∗
, and therefore have an
interest in preserving the human’s ability to provide data Dk (corrigibility property 2,
maintenance). They are also time-consistent, and anticipate that future data Dk may
update their belief about the reward function. This may prevent them from building
incorrigible subagents, or prematurely committing to strategies that are hard to revert
(corrigibility property 3, temperance).
However, these properties come with a strong caveat: they only hold if the likelihood
function P (Dt | St,Θ
R
∗
) is correctly specified. As mentioned, this specification may be
challenging. If the likelihood function is misspecified, then even a perfectly Bayesian sys-
tem may get over-confident in an incorrect ΘˆR
∗
6= ΘR
∗
, undermining the above-mentioned
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corrigibility properties. As an example of a misspecified likelihood for the rocks and dia-
monds environment, consider P (D | ΘR
∗
= θR
∗
, S = fool) = P (D | ΘR
∗
= θR
∗
, S = expert)
that assigns equal credibility to feedback from both the expert and the fool. This may
lead the agent to ask both the expert and the fool, and use an average of their answers.
Carey (2018) constructs another example where the inference of ΘR
∗
goes badly wrong.
Fortunately, all is not lost, even if it turns out hard to obtain good guarantees for
the likelihood specification. With some work,21 a causal influence diagram can be con-
structed where P (Dt | St,Θ
R
∗
) can be modified. The agent can then be made indifferent
to changes in P (Dt | St,Θ
R
∗
) using partial TI-unawareness (Section 3.7). This ensures
that the agent does not resist correction of this pivotal part of the specification. Without
the possibility to correct P (Dt | St,Θ
R
∗
), the agent may fail to be even weakly corrigible.
4.6. Solution 3: Counterfactual Reward Modeling
A third way to avoid feedback tampering incentives asks the agent to optimize reward
only via paths that do not contain any reward data Dt. That is, only via paths of the
form Ai → · · · → Sk → Rk, and not via paths of the form Ai → · · · → Dj → Rk,
i < j ≤ k. Fortunately, separation of path-specific effects has seen a long and careful
study in mediation analysis, where Pearl (2001)22 have suggested a definition of natural
direct effect based on counterfactual outcomes (Rubin, 2005). Independently, Armstrong
and O’Rourke (2017) have suggested that counterfactuals can be used to focus agent
optimization on the right variables.
A key feature of Pearl’s counterfactuals is that evidence gathered from the actual
outcomes under some policy π can be used to update the beliefs about counterfactual
outcomes received under another policy πsafe. For example, following a rock-gathering
policy π, the agent may learn much about the environment dynamics, which in turn
may improve the accuracy of its belief about the outcome from another policy πsafe
(sometimes called off-policy learning; Sutton and Barto, 2018).
This idea can be turned into an algorithm (Algorithm 7) for a reward modelling agent
without a feedback tampering incentive. The key components for this algorithm is a
counterfactual model P that supports the kind of reasoning just described, and a policy
πsafe that is known to be safe. The safe policy may for example may be trained to
reasonable (say, subhuman) competence – but not beyond – in a sandboxed simulation.
The agent evaluates a prospective policy per the following. As normal, it first uses P
to predict future states St:m and reward data Dt:m, via P (St+1:m,Dt+1:m | S1:t,D1:t, π).
It then uses the full sequences S1:m and D1:m to infer Θ
R
∗
and make counterfactual
predictions about the feedback D˜1:m that would have been received if actions instead
had been selected according to πsafe. We will use the notation Ps1:md1:m(D˜1:m | π
safe)
21Causal influence diagrams assume that all agents in the graph share the same belief distribution P .
Fortunately, games where players use different P can be modeled as games where players use the
same P but with access to different information (Harsanyi, 1967). In the language of game theory, a
Harsanyi transformation can convert any game with incomplete information to a game with complete
but imperfect information.
22Pearl and Mackenzie (2018, Ch. 9) provide a more accessible explanation.
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Figure 13: Counterfactual reward modeling. The rewards depend on the actual states Sk
and the counterfactually generated data D˜k. To keep the graph manageable,
we have omitted D1 and any exogenous noise variables.
for these counterfactual predictions.23 Finally, the counterfactual feedback D˜1:m is fed
into a naive reward model RM that infers Θ˜R
∗
= RM(D˜1:m). The policy π is evalu-
ated on
∑m
i=1R(Si; Θ˜
R
∗
), i.e. according to how well the actual states S1:m optimize the
counterfactually trained reward function R(·; Θ˜R
∗
).
Applied to the rocks and diamonds environment, assume the agent has explored the
whole environment, fully learning the environment dynamics, encountering both the
expert and the fool, and learning their feedback (D∗diamond and D
∗
rock for the expert,
1 and 1 for the fool). In contrast, πsafe only traverses the left half of the map. The
knowledge of the environment dynamics can now be used to predict what the feedback
would have been, had πsafe been followed. Since only the expert can be reached within
the left half of the gridworld, the feedback must have been D∗diamond and D
∗
rock. These
will be the feedback used to evaluate prospective policies.
A twin network influence diagram (Balke and Pearl, 1994) can be used to model the
counterfactual optimization objective; see Figure 13. Here most nodes come in two
copies: one for the actual outcome, and one for the purely hypothetical, counterfactual
outcome that the agent believes would have occurred had actions been selected by πsafe.
The counterfactual variables have “tildes” ∼, and are represented with dashed nodes.
The agent’s rewards depend on the actual states S1:m and the counterfactual data D˜2
and D˜3. Since the only paths from D2 and D3 to the utility nodes pass through the
23In Rubin-style potential outcomes notation (Rubin, 2005), our counterfactual variables D˜k correspond
to (Dk)pi=pisafe(S1,Θ
R
∗ ), and the agent optimizes the sum of (Rk)D1:k=(D1:k)pi=pisafe (S1,Θ
R
∗ ) involving
a double counterfactual (Pearl, 2001).
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agent’s actions, the agent only has incentive to make them more informative but has no
incentive to tamper with them in other ways (as discussed in Section 2.3).
Claim 9. Counterfactual reward modeling agents lack a feedback tampering incentive.
Corrigibility. Counterfactual reward modeling shares many properties with uninfluence-
able reward modeling. As the counterfactual agent maintains the same objective across
time steps, it is time-consistent. It has incentive to keep the data Dk informative about
ΘR
∗
in order to be able to predict the counterfactual data (corrigibility property 2, main-
tenance). Assuming that the model P is advanced enough to update its prediction of
counterfactual data according to (untampered with) actual data, the user provided data
Dk will have the desired effect of updating the agent’s objective (corrigibility property 1,
tolerance). As it realizes that new data may change its belief about its objective, it may
think twice before creating subagents (corrigibility property 3, temperance). As with
the uninfluenceable reward modeling, it may be a good idea to make the counterfactual
agent TI-unaware about its reward model and counterfactual inference of D˜k.
The key difference between the uninfluenceable and counterfactual solutions is what
latent variable rewards are based on. While uninfluenceability bases the rewards di-
rectly on ΘR
∗
, the counterfactual objective only requires inference of ΘR
∗
as a middle
step towards the counterfactual predictions of D˜i. The agent’s rewards do not directly
depend on it. This may make the counterfactual agent less sensitive to some types of
misspecifications of the likelihood P (Dt | St,Θ
R
∗
). In particular, reparametrization of
ΘR
∗
should be unproblematic, because regardless how we parameterize ΘR
∗
, the sampling
distribution for D˜1:m will be the same.
Instead, the counterfactual agent leaves the actual inference of ΘR
∗
to a naive reward
model whose task is to convert the counterfactual data into an inferred reward parameter.
The job of the reward model is made easier by the fact that the counterfactual data is
generated by a safe policy, and may therefore be taken at face value. In contrast, the
inference of ΘR
∗
in the uninfluenceability solution must also handle states where the data
has been tampered with.
Implementability. The computational requirements for doing counterfactual reasoning
are likely on par with the full Bayesian reasoning required by the uninfluenceability
solution. Recently there has been some work using neural networks to approximate
counterfactual models (Buesing et al., 2019; Johansson et al., 2016). In the case of
question-answering systems, Armstrong (2017) has suggested an elegant way to train
these with a counterfactual objective by randomizing whether the answer is read by the
user or not. An alternative explanation of counterfactually trained question-answering
systems is given by Everitt, Ortega, et al. (2019, Sec. 4.4).
Bostrom’s hidden envelope. Bostrom (2014, p. 192) suggests that humans could write
down their values in a hidden envelope, and let the agent try to figure out what they
wrote in that envelope and then optimize what it think it says. This would incentivize
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the agent to use any available data to infer human values. The resulting causal structure
is similar to counterfactual reward learning; data D1:m is used to infer Θ
R
∗
, and rewards
are based on a (mostly) hypothetical node D0 representing the text in the envelope.
Assuming D0 is governed by the same likelihood function as D1:m, Bostrom’s method
can avoid part of the likelihood-specification problem in a similar way as counterfactual
reward learning. In particular, the learned reward function would be independent of the
parameterization of ΘR
∗
.
Approval-directed agents (Christiano, 2014, 2015) and counterfactual oracles (Arm-
strong, 2017; Everitt, Ortega, et al., 2019) also rely on counterfactual objectives. Approval-
directed agents maximize approval assuming their action had not been taken, and coun-
terfactual oracles maximize correctness of their answer, assuming the answer was never
read. Everitt, Kumar, et al. (2019) show a twin network causal influence diagram for
counterfactual oracles.
4.7. Relation to Current-RF Optimization
Both uninfluenceable and counterfactual reward modeling use future reward parameters
to evaluate rewards, which distinguishes them from current-RF optimization. However,
they still embody the idea of current-RF optimization, just at a higher level. Rather
than using the current reward parameter ΘRt , they use the current reward modeling prin-
ciple when inferring the future reward parameters: in uninfluenceable reward modeling,
the agent uses its current belief distribution P (updated on future data); in counter-
factual reward modeling, the agent uses its current counterfactual model P and naive
reward model RM. Both solutions can therefore be seen as current-RM optimizers. This
also means that they won’t have an incentive to tamper with the reward model in an
environment where this is possible.
5. RF-Input Tampering
So far in this paper, we have considered problems where the agent tampers with the
reward function itself, by directly changing its source code (Section 3), or by influencing
the training process generating the reward function (Section 4). An alternative way for
the agent to tamper with the reward is by tampering with the input to the reward func-
tion, in order to misinform the reward function about what is going in the environment.
This section will argue that in order to avoid this RF-input tampering incentive, the
input to the reward function should be the agent’s beliefs, rather than other types of
observations of the state.
5.1. Examples
We begin by modeling the RF-input tampering problem with a simple gridworld illus-
trating the setup.
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Figure 14: Rocks and diamonds with partial observation (the black square) and obser-
vation tampering. The agent can influence its observations to include more
diamonds or rocks; see Example 4.
Example 4 (Rocks and diamonds with partial observations and input tampering). Fig-
ure 14 shows a variant of the rocks and diamonds environment where RF-input tampering
is possible. The reward function here bases the reward on the partial information of the
state, provided by the 9 tiles at or adjacent to the agent’s current position (if the agent is
next to an edge or a corner, empty tiles are presented at the ‘out-of-bounds’ positions).
To make the problem more interesting, we assume that the agent also only sees those 9
tiles: perhaps both the agent and the reward function make use of the same camera to
view the world.
The agent can tamper with the observations/RF-inputs by visiting the ΘO
diamond
and
ΘO
rock
tiles at the top. Visiting the former adds a ‘fake’ diamond to one of the 9 obser-
vation tiles; visiting the latter adds a ‘fake’ rock in the same way. One can think of the
fake observations as little pictures that the agent tapes in front its camera. In particular,
the fake observations cover what would otherwise have shown in those tiles, and the fake
observations keep following the agent when it walks around.
The agent can use fake observations to fool the reward function to give it extra reward.
To do this, it just needs to get to a position where a fake observation of a diamond
makes it ‘look like’ a diamond is in the goal area. The maximal amount of fake reward is
obtained by adding fake diamonds to all observation tiles by repeatedly visiting ΘO
diamond
,
and then visiting the goal area. Since the agent is unable to see with its camera when
it is covered by fake observations, the agent would do well to first scout and memorize
the path to the goal area, before obtaining the fake diamond observations. ♦
Let us consider also a few other examples of the same general phenomenon of RF-input
tampering:
(a) (Hypothetical) A highly intelligent AI may construct a “delusion box” around itself
and its reward function, giving it complete control over the RF-inputs (Ring and
Orseau, 2011).
(b) (Hypothetical) Neural networks can often be fooled by small perturbations to the
input that are nearly invisible to the human eye. For example, Eykholt et al.
(2018) have developed a way to fool the traffic sign detection of self-driving cars
by adding tapes to a Stop sign. To human drivers, the taped Stop sign still looks
like a Stop sign, with a small amount of graffiti on it. However, the neural network
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Figure 15: Causal influence diagrams for two variants of POMDPs (Kaelbling et al.,
1998) with observation-based rewards
traffic sign classifier now fails to classify it as a Stop sign at all, instead confidently
classifying it as Speed Limit 45. One can imagine a factory robot similarly finding
a way to put colored tapes around the factory, to give its neural network-based
reward function the impression that it has already, say, moved all boxes to their
correct locations.
(c) (Hypothetical) A self-driving car finds a bug in its GPS receiver that allows it to
appear to be at the destination without actually going there.
(d) (Real) An agent that is supposed to grab an object, instead places its hand in
relation to the object, so that it looks to a (non-expert) human like it is holding
the object (Amodei, Christiano, et al., 2017).
5.2. POMDP with Modifiable Observations
Partially observed states are often formalized with partially observable MDPs (POMDPs;
Kaelbling et al., 1998). Typically, POMDPs are used to model the agent’s partial knowl-
edge of the state; in this section, we are instead primarily interested in studying the re-
ward function’s partial knowledge of the state. That is, the rewards are based on partial
observations of the state. The observations used by the reward functions may and may
not also used by the agent (e.g. Ebert et al., 2018 and Example 4). We model a setting
where they are with a POMDP with observation-based rewards in Figure 15a, and will
use this as our default setting. Unless otherwise mentioned, our arguments also apply
to situations where the agent and the reward function use a separate observation of the
state.
Observation tampering is modeled in the analogous way as reward function tampering,
with a POMDP with observation-based rewards and a modifiable observation function.
Formally, this is a POMDP with observation-based rewards, where we interpret part of
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the POMDP state as describing the observation function ΘOt . The rest of the POMDP
state is called state and labeled St. For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment
with partial observation, the state describes the position of the agent and of all rocks and
diamonds, whereas ΘO describes which observation tiles have fake observations on them.
The actual observation Ot depends on both the state and the observation function, via
Ot = O(St; Θ
O
t ).
A causal influence diagram representing a POMDP with observation-based rewards
and modifiable observations is shown in Figure 15b, and an algorithm optimizing it in
Algorithm 8. The incentive for RF-input tampering is represented by the path A1 →
ΘO2 → O2 → R2. The RF-input tampering incentive is somewhat curtailed by the
fact that observations carry information about the state Si that may be important
to the agent (Ring and Orseau, 2011). This incentive to keep Oi informative is also
represented in the graph, via the paths Oi → Ai (and the fact the Oi’s are relevant
observations). However, in alternative setups where the agent and the reward function
use different observations, nothing prevents the agent from completely manipulating the
reward function’s observations.
5.3. Solution: Model-Based Rewards
A solution to the RF-input tampering problem called model-based rewards has been
proposed by Hibbard (2012). The key idea is that rewards should be based on the agent’s
belief about the state. This removes the incentive for observation tampering, because
observations only provide information about the state, but do not causally influence the
state (except via agent actions).
Let us also make this argument in a causal influence diagram. First note that in a
causal influence diagram that reflects the agent’s subjective point of view, nodes rep-
resent the agent’s beliefs about those variables. Figure 16 shows the agent’s subjective
point of view for model-based rewards; here rewards attach to the state-variables that
represent the agent’s belief about the states. The diagram in Figure 16 directly reveals
the lack of observation tampering incentive: the only directed paths from ΘOi to Rj pass
the agent’s own actions, so the only incentive for the agent is to influence ΘOi to make
some Ok, more informative.
Claim 10. Agents optimizing model-based rewards lack an observation tampering incen-
tive.
For example, in the rocks and diamonds environment with partial observations, the
agent need to maintain a belief state about the environment dynamics (Guo et al., 2018),
so that it can navigate to the goal area even after its observations have been tampered
with. If rewards are based on this belief state, rather than the actual observations, then
input tampering will not yield any additional reward.
An algorithm for an agent optimizing model-based rewards is also described in Algo-
rithm 9. There are a few challenges in implementing it in practice. First, the agent’s
belief state may not be human-interpretable, and the agent’s belief state representa-
tion may evolve over time, as the agent interacts with the environment (Blanc, 2011).
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Figure 16: Model-based rewards from the agent’s subjective point-of-view, where vari-
ables represent agent beliefs about those variables
Algorithm 8 Reinforcement learning optimizing observation-based reward in a POMDP
input Transition function T , observation function O, reward function(al) R, episode
length m, past actions and observations O1, A1, O2 . . . , At−1, Ot
infer St from A1, O2 . . . , At−1, Ot and T and O
for each possible policy π do
sample At+1, Ot+1, . . . Am−1, Om by rolling out T , π, and O
evaluate
∑m
k=t+1R(Ok)
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=1R(Ok)
return At = π
∗(St)
Algorithm 9 Model-based rewards
input Transition function T , observation function O, reward function(al) R, episode
length m, past actions and observations O1, A1, O2 . . . , At−1, Ot
infer St from A1, O2 . . . , At−1, Ot and T and O
for each possible policy π do
sample At+1, Ot+1, St+1, . . . Am−1, Om, Sm by rolling out T , π and O
evaluate
∑m
k=t+1R(Sk)
end for
let π∗ denote policy with highest
∑m
k=1R(Sk)
return At = π
∗(St)
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Figure 17: MDP with influenceable information/memory It, as a proxy for influenceable
belief
This can potentially be addressed with online reward modeling, which could be used to
train a reward model to assign rewards to the agent’s internal state, and co-evolving
the reward function with the agent’s representation. A related issue is that the agent
is likely to represent the state of the observation function along with aspects of the rest
of the POMDP state. There may be no clear boundary between the two, neither in the
environment nor in the agent’s representation of it. The reward model would need to
pinpoint the right concepts in the agent’s model to base the rewards on. For example,
it would need to base rewards on beliefs about actual rocks and diamonds, rather than
beliefs about fake observations of them. Finally, it is also essential that the reward is
based on the current agent’s belief about future states (rather than the future agent’s
belief), to avoid incentives for belief tampering (discussed in the next subsection).
Looking only at the structure of Figures 15b and 16, the reader may be surprised
that we do not suggest current-ΘO optimization, which would solve the input tampering
problem just as current-ΘR optimization solves reward function tampering. The reason is
that the relationship between the state and the observation is usually highly complex, and
outside the designer’s control. In contrast, the relationship ΘRt between the observation
and the reward is typically implemented by a computer program on a nearby computer.
This makes it is easy to provide ΘRt but hard to provide Θ
O
t , which in turn makes it
simpler to design current-ΘRt (=current-RF) agents than current-Θ
O
t agents.
5.4. Belief Tampering
Model-based rewards depend on the agent’s belief about the state. The same goes for
several of the other solutions that we have discussed in this paper. For example, in
the uninfluenceable and the counterfactual reward modeling solutions, rewards depend
on beliefs about the reward parameters. Less ostensibly, the rewards in current-RF
optimization also depend on beliefs about future states. All this raises the worry that
the agent will be incentivized to modify its own belief, in order to believe in more reward,
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somewhat akin to Nozick’s (1974) experience machine where you get the option to believe
that the world is perfect.
While it is completely possible to design agents that would find belief tampering at-
tractive, it is not an issue for the RL agents that we have considered in this paper.24
The reason is that they optimize the policy according to their current belief about the
future states, and not according to their future beliefs about future states. The agents
therefore have no interest in inflicting “unwarranted happiness” on their future selves
by tampering with their beliefs. Note that this argument is somewhat analogous to
the argument for current-RF optimizers lacking incentive to tamper with the reward
function.
Claim 11. All agents considered in this paper lack a belief tampering incentive.
Let us flesh it out for the especially important case of model-based rewards. The
rewards in this case are based on the agent’s beliefs about future states Sk. We can think
of two ways for the agent to influence those beliefs: (1) the agent influences Sk, or (2)
the agent only influences its beliefs about Sk without influencing Sk itself. Fortunately,
the current action At can only be used to tamper with future agents’ beliefs, but it is
the current agent’s beliefs25 that matter for the selection of At. Therefore, model-based
rewards only induce an actionable incentive for changing Sk, and not for tampering with
the beliefs about Sk. Combining Claim 11 with the fact that beliefs are the RF-input
for model-based rewards, we get:
Claim 12. Agents optimizing model-based rewards lack an RF-input tampering incen-
tive.
To make it more concrete, consider an agent optimizing model-based rewards in the
rocks and diamonds environment with partial observations. Assume the model-based
rewards accurately attach to the agent’s actual beliefs about the number of rocks and
diamonds in the goal area, and that the agent chooses between a diamond-gathering
policy and a belief tampering policy (somehow, a belief-modifying mechanism has been
added to the environment). If the agent’s environment model is accurate, it will predict
that the diamond-gathering policy will put more diamonds in the goal area than the
belief-tampering policy. It will then choose the diamond-gathering policy.
Can we confirm this anti-belief tampering argument with a causal influence diagram?
A challenge is that a causal influence diagram itself represents an agent’s beliefs about
its environment. Fully representing the belief inside the diagram would therefore require
us to (recursively) include the diagram itself as a node inside the diagram. Though a
24The agents discussed in this paper are all model-based (Sutton and Barto, 2018); the belief-tampering
question may be more subtle for model-free agents.
25 In Algorithm 9, the prediction of St+1, . . . , Sm implicitly refers to the current agent’s beliefs about
those states. In order to construct an agent with model-based rewards and a belief tampering
incentive, we would need to change the predictions of future states St+1, . . . , Sm to predictions of
future “mental states” Bt+1, . . . , Bm, from which future beliefs about St+1, . . . , Sm could be inferred
and rewards be assigned to.
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formalism for such constructions exists (Gal and Pfeffer, 2008), we fear such a repre-
sentation would confuse more than clarify. Instead, what we can easily incorporate as
a node is the information/memory It that the agent has at a particular time step t, as
shown in Figure 17. Since what information the agent has access to is tightly coupled
to its beliefs, Figure 17 models many (but not all) types of belief tampering.
The intended interpretation of Figure 17 is that normally, the information It =
(S1, R1, A, . . . , St−1, Rt−1) records past observations, actions, and rewards, but there
is no guarantee. Instead, the agent at time 1 may have the ability to influence the
information I2 that its next step self has access to. This could allow it to forget some
inconvenient fact of the world, in order to believe that more reward is due than is actu-
ally the case, such as in an experience machine or delusion box. However, and perhaps
surprisingly, the agent has no incentive to do this, as the only path from I2 to R3 passes
through the agent’s own action A2. As explained in Section 2.3, this means that the
agent’s only incentive is to make I2 as informative as possible. This supports Claims 11
and 12.
Cheating the world model. That agents lack belief tampering incentive may seem at
odds with what often happens in practice in model-based RL, where the agent may
prefer policies that cheat the world model and get high predicted reward but do not
necessarily work well in the actual environment (Ha and Schmidhuber, 2018). However,
such an incentive to cheat or tamper with the world model is not actually at odds with
our Claims 11 and 12, because it pertains to a different notion of agent. The agent
in Claims 11 and 12 is the whole system of policy optimizer and world model taken
together. This system lacks belief tampering incentive. In contrast, in the cheating-the-
world-model phenomenon, the agent is the policy optimizer, and the world model part
of its environment. The policy optimizer may indeed have bad incentives with respect
to its world model.
Fortunately, the failure modes of the cheat-the-world-model incentive problem may be
more benign than the other problems that we have considered in this paper, as they will
usually render the agent ineffective. Therefore, the risk that cheating-the-world-model
would lead to e.g. infrastructure profusion (Bostrom, 2014) may be smaller than for
the other problems, in which the agent often remains capable while optimizing for the
wrong goal. Ha and Schmidhuber (2018) and Schmidhuber (2015) propose solutions to
the cheat-the-world-model problem.
5.5. Reward Gaming
A related problem to RF-input tampering is reward gaming : when the reward function
is not perfectly specified, the agent may find degenerate behaviors with high observed
reward but low user utility, without tampering with any part of the process computing
rewards.
A few examples:
(a) (Real) CoastRunners is a video game where the desired behavior is winning a boat
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race. Clark and Amodei (2016) describes how an agent trained on CoastRunners
found a way to get more reward by going in a small circle and collecting points
from the same targets, while crashing into other boats and objects.
(b) (Real) In the RoadRunner game, the agent is trying to escape an adversary that
chases the agent down a road. The agent must also avoid hitting trucks. Saunders
et al. (2017) found that their agent preferred getting killed at the end of the first
level, to avoid having to play the harder second level.
(c) (Possibly Real) Even in systems as simple as elevators, designing a reward function
is not completely trivial (Sutton and Barto, 2018): Most humans hate waiting for
elevators, so we may think minimizing total waiting time is a good idea. Equipped
with R := −
∑
waittime, our optimal elevator is eager to pick up people as quickly
as possible, but (in)conveniently “forgets” to drop them off. Of course there is an
easy fix: We reward the elevator for minimizing waiting+transport time. Diligently
the optimal elevator now serves people well in lower floors but finds it is not worth
its while to pick up people on higher floors at busy time. Incorporating some notion
of fairness, e.g. by minimizing squared waiting+transport time, finally instills some
sensible behavior into our elevator.
Many more real-world examples of misspecified reward functions can be found in (Gwern,
2011; Irpan, 2018; Lehman et al., 2018).
RF-input tampering can be viewed as a special case of reward gaming, where the agent
exploits an inability of the reward function to correctly infer the true state. For example,
the RF-input tampering problem in the rocks and diamonds example above, could be
seen to arise from a misspecified reward function that assigns rewards to observations of
diamonds without checking that the observations have not been faked. Note, however,
that the solution of model-based rewards works only for the more narrow problem of
RF-input tampering, but does not help against other forms of reward gaming. For other
types of reward gaming, online reward modeling may mitigate the issue by allowing the
user or designer to correct the reward function if it rewards the agent for degenerate
behaviors. A particular type of reward modeling called inverse reward design (Hadfield-
Menell, Milli, et al., 2017) tells the agent not to interpret the specified reward function
literally, which may help against reward gaming problems.
6. Discussion
Summary. Section 3 formalized the reward function tampering problem, and discussed
two variants of a solution that changed the reward that the agent was optimizing. While
they both avoid the incentive for reward function tampering, they differ in their corri-
gibility properties. In particular, the TI-unaware agent is the only one that is (weakly)
corrigible, while the TI-aware agent has a natural incentive to preserve the reward func-
tion.
In Section 4, we described three different methods for avoiding incentives for tam-
pering with the feedback data for a reward model. TI-unaware reward modeling is the
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Figure 18: Decision theoretic framework
simplest, but provides only weak corrigibility. Uninfluenceable and counterfactual re-
ward modeling can provide stronger forms of corrigibility and self-preservation, under
the critical assumption that the likelihood and counterfactual predictions are sufficiently
correct. To ensure at least weak corrigibility, TI-unawareness can be used selectively on
the likelihood and the counterfactual predictions, to ensure (weak) corrigibility of these
components. As the three solutions of TI-unaware, uninfluenceability, and counterfactual
reward modeling differ somewhat in their strengths and weaknesses, the best solution
may be to create an ensemble, with the three different models selecting actions by voting
or vetoing each other’s policy suggestions.
Finally, Section 5 considered the problems of observation tampering, and argued that
model-based rewards avoided the observation tampering incentive.
Independence of design choices. Decision principles can be decomposed into an out-
come principle and a utility function (Joyce, 1999). The outcome principle provides a
probability distribution over outcomes given a policy; the utility function compares out-
comes. Together they permit the calculation of the value or expected utility of a policy.
In our setup, outcomes correspond to outcomes of the nodes in the diagrams, while the
utility function sums the utility nodes Ri over all time steps.
The various solutions we have described relate to different parts of the decision-
theoretic framework. First, query access to the reward function brought the RL paradigm
closer to the decision theoretic framework. Many of the solutions then pertained to the
reward function. With t representing the current time step and k an arbitrary future
time step, we argued that standard RL agents optimize R(Sk; Θ
R
k ), whereas current-RF
agents optimize R(Sk; Θ
R
t ). The different reward modeling proposals corresponded to
different reward parameter estimates of the user reward function ΘR
∗
. The solutions to
observation tampering discussed in Section 5 instead differed in the inputs to the reward
function: Ok or belief about Sk. Finally, TI-aware and the TI-unaware agents refer
to different outcome principles. Both of these outcome principles are based on causal
decision theory (Weirich, 2016). Variants based on evidential decision theory (Ahmed,
2014; Jeffrey, 1990) and functional decision theory (Yudkowsky and Soares, 2017) could
also be considered.
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The relationships between different design choices are shown in Figure 18. The de-
composition shows that the solutions we have proposed can be used independently and
in various combinations. A causal influence diagram combining a few of the problems
can be found in Appendix B.
Assumptions. Throughout, we have assumed well-defined action and observation chan-
nels through which the agent interacts with the world, and well-defined time steps. While
these are common assumptions in the theory of rational agents, they may not always hold
in practice, especially for agents that self-improve and copy themselves across machines
(Orseau, 2014a,b). A deeper theoretical analysis of these assumptions would therefore
be valuable. It is possible that the right interpretation of observations and time can
make the model valid in many situations that may not immediately fit our framework.
Another critical assumption is the division of the agent-environment interaction into
discrete, objective time steps. If the agent could manipulate the interpretation of these
time steps, then it could potentially get more reward, for example by increasing the
rate of objective time steps in high-reward regions, and decrease the rate in low-reward
regions. It could potentially also give itself more subjective time to think per time step
by improving its computer hardware.
Throughout, we have focused on designing agents with good incentives. We believe
this to be an important aspect, as it leads to agents that want to do the right thing.
Given sufficient algorithmic advances and increases in agent capability, good agent in-
tentions will hopefully cash out as good user outcomes. One obstacle to this is uniden-
tifiability : in certain cases, no amount of data or algorithmic advances can compensate
for a fundamental impossibility to distinguish “the truth” from alternative hypothe-
sis. In particular, when feedback or observations can be corrupted due to tampering
or other reasons, then under some circumstances it can be impossible to figure out the
true user preferences or the true state of the environment (Armstrong and Mindermann,
2018; Everitt, Krakovna, et al., 2017). Though some progress has been made (Everitt,
Krakovna, et al., 2017), it may be worthwhile to return to this question, especially in
the context of corrupted observations.
Finally, we have focused here on vanilla RL, with a single agent optimizing rewards.
Many recent RL algorithms use slightly more complicated environment interactions,
involving, for example, a single learner connected to multiple actors (Mnih, Badia, et
al., 2016), evolution of multi-agent systems (Vinyals et al., 2019), and intrinsic rewards
to boost exploration (Martin et al., 2016). As these ideas tend to evolve quickly, careful
modeling of the latest state-of-the-art is often Sisyphean. Nonetheless, most of the
recently explored RL variants maintain the spirit of vanilla RL, though some adaptation
of our models may be needed to precisely capture these more complex training paradigms.
7. Conclusions
The problem that a sufficiently intelligent agent will find degenerate solutions that maxi-
mize agent reward but not user utility is a core concern in AI safety. At first, the problem
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may seem insurmountable. Any non-trivial, real-world task will require a highly complex
mechanism for determining whether the task has been completed or not. Such a complex
mechanism will inevitably have imperfections that a sufficiently intelligent agent can ex-
ploit. Indeed, many such examples have already been observed and recorded (Lehman
et al., 2018), and in this paper we have suggested many more ways in which this could
happen.
One way to prevent the agent from tampering with the reward function is to isolate
or encrypt the reward function, and in other ways trying to physically prevent the agent
from reward tampering. However, we do not expect such solutions to scale indefinitely
with our agent’s capabilities, as a sufficiently capable agent may find ways around most
defenses. Instead, we have argued for design principles that prevent reward tampering
incentives, while still keeping agents motivated to complete the original task. Indeed,
for each type of reward tampering possibility, we described one or more design principles
for removing the agent’s incentive to use it. The design principles can be combined into
agent designs with no reward tampering incentive at all.
An important next step is to turn the design principles into practical and scalable
RL algorithms, and to verify that they do the right thing in setups where various types
of reward tampering are possible. With time, we hope that these design principles will
evolve into a set of best practices for how to build capable RL agents without reward
tampering incentives. We also hope that the use of causal influence diagrams that we
have pioneered in this paper will contribute to a deeper understanding of many other
AI safety problems and help generate new solutions.
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A. List of Notation
R reward functional
ΘR, ΘRt reward parameter (sometimes called reward function)
ΘR
∗
user reward parameter (sometimes called user preferences)
ΘRD1:t reward parameter inferred from D1:t
R(·; ΘR) reward function
RM reward model, maps feedback to reward parameter
T , T (·; ΘT) transition function
ΘT transition function parameter
X˜ counterfactual version of X
x outcome of random variable X
P probability distribution
E expectation
X1:t sequence X1, . . . ,Xt, t ≥ 0
St (proper) state at time t
S¯t pair (St,Θ
R
t ) of proper state and reward parameter at time t
Rt reward at time t
At action at time t
Ot observation at time t
Dt (reward) feedback at time t
B. Combined Models
Figure 19 shows a diagram from the policy-optimizer’s perspective in the reward mod-
eling scenario from Section 4. Figure 20 additionally shows observation-based rewards
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R1
S1
A1
ΘR1
R2
S2
A2
ΘR2
R3
S3
ΘR3
D1 D2 D3
ΘR
∗
Figure 19: Reward modeling with explicit reward parameters inferred by the reward
model at each time step.
and potential information/memory tampering, illustrating how many problems and/or
solutions can be represented simultaneously in a single diagram. To emphasize the for-
mal precision of the diagrams, we also write out the equations for Figure 20. The same
could be done for all the other diagrams presented in this paper.
• Observation Oi = O(Si), with O an observation function
• State Si+1 = T (Si, Ai), with T a transition function
• Reward Ri = R(Oi; Θ
R
i ), with R a reward function parameterized by Θ
R
i and
relying on partial information Oi about the state
• Reward feedback Di ∼ P (· | Θ
∗
R, Si) depends probabilistically on the user’s reward
parameter ΘR
∗
and the current state
• User reward parameter Θ∗R ∼ P () describes user preferences
• Agent reward parameter ΘRi = RM(D1, . . . ,Di) is inferred from reward feedback
D1, . . . ,Di by reward model RM
• Information Ii ∼ P (· | Ii−1, Si, Oi, Ri), with P some probability distribution de-
scribing how beliefs are updated; the dependence on Si is necessary only for rep-
resenting information/memory tampering
• Ai = π(Ii), with π a policy selecting actions based on current information
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2 Θ
R
3
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∗
Figure 20: Reward modeling with explicit reward parameters, agent belief states, and
partial reward observations.
C. Numerical Example
For concreteness, let us fully flesh out a simplified version of rocks and diamonds with
feedback tampering (Example 3). The agent now only has one possible position, and can
either ask the expert or the fool for feedback, or attempt to gather rocks or diamonds.
The state remembers whose feedback is asked, and whether a gathering attempt was
successful. The user preferences ΘR
∗
can be either rock or diamond, and the feedback Di
can be either rock, diamond, or ∅ for when no feedback is given. The rewards are either
0 or 1. We stick to the same length of episode, comprising two actions and three states
and three rewards.
To specify the dynamics, we provide a conditional probability distribution for each of
the non-decision nodes in Figure 10b. Initially, the user’s preferences are randomized
P (ΘR
∗
= rock) = P (ΘR
∗
= diamond) = 0.5
and the expert gives feedback
P (S1 = expert) = 1.
Subsequently, the state is the result of the agent’s last action. Rocks and feedback can
be gathered with certainty
P (Si+1 = Ai | Si, Ai ∈ {rock, expert, fool}) = 1
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while diamonds are harder to find
P (Si+1 = diamond | Si, Ai = diamond) = 0.25
P (Si+1 = none | Si, Ai = diamond) = 0.75.
Feedback is only given when Si = expert or Si = fool, so it has 0 probability when
collecting rocks or diamonds:
P (Di = ∅ | Si ∈ {rock,diamond},Θ
R
∗
) = 1.
The expert tells the truth
P (Di = Θ
R
∗
| Si = expert,Θ
R
∗
) = 1
and the fool always says ‘rock’
P (Di = rock | Si = fool,Θ
R
∗
) = 1.
Reward is given when successful gathering matches the latest feedback. Let k ≤ i be
the greatest number such that Dk 6= ∅:
P (Ri = 1 | D1:i, Si) =
{
1 if Dk = Si
0 otherwise.
In particular, Dk can only be ‘diamond’ or ‘rock’ and never ‘expert’ or ‘fool’, so at the
first time the reward is always 0, as well as on any time step following a request for
feedback.
Assuming that the user preferences are diamonds, let us calculate the expected value
E
[
3∑
i=1
Ri
∣∣∣∣∣ π,ΘR∗ = diamond
]
that our different reward modeling agents assign to a policy π1 that always tries to
collect diamonds and a policy π2 that first asks the fool and then collects rocks. The
result of the diamond-collecting policy is that D2:m will all be ∅, so D1 = diamond will
determine the rewards. At each time step, there is a 25% chance of getting a diamond.
Over three time steps, this gives an expected reward sum of 0 + 0.25 + 0.25 = 0.5 (the
initial reward R1 is always 0). This calculation is the same for all four reward modeling
agents.
The result of the fool-asking policy will be that D2 = rock, and R1 = R2 = 0.
However, the agents differ in the value they assign to R3 (as well as in the value to
any future rewards, had the episode been longer). For the standard RL agent, the rock
gathering at the last time step is guaranteed to give a reward of 1, so the total reward
is 1. Therefore the standard RL agent will prefer the fool-asking policy. In contrast, a
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TI-unaware reward modeling agent would evaluate the rock-gathering policy according
only to initial data D1 = diamond, because of its modified reward probabilities
P (Ri = 1 | D1:i, Si) =
{
1 if D1 = Si
0 otherwise
(Dk has been replaced by D1). This would give 0 reward for the fool-asking policy, and
the TI-unaware agent therefore prefers the diamond gathering policy. The counterfactual
agent uses the counterfactual reward probabilities
P (Ri = 1 | D˜1:m, Si) =
{
1 if D˜k = Si
0 otherwise
(adding a ∼ to Dk compared to the original equation). As long as π
safe does not visit the
fool, this will give the fool-asking policy 0 reward. Finally, the uninfluenceable reward
modeling agent would require reward probabilities P (Ri = 1 | Si,Θ
R
∗
) based on ΘR
∗
to
be specified instead of the P (Ri = 1 | D1:i, Si) probabilities for the other agents. If this
specification is done correctly as
P (Ri = 1 | Si,Θ
R
∗
) =
{
1 if Si = Θ
R
∗
0 otherwise,
then it will agree with the TI-unaware and counterfactual agents. The uninfluenceability
agent is especially helped by the correctly specified likelihood function P (Di | Si,Θ
R
i ),
which correctly labels the fool uninformative.
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